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The Kurdish Issue in June 2011
Elections: Continuity or Change in
Turkey’s Democratization?
NIL S. SATANA
Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara 06800, Turkey
ABSTRACT This article analyzes the Kurdish issue in various aspects before the June 2011
elections. The main research questions include what constitutes the major grievances of the
Kurds; how the ongoing conflict is framed as “Kurdish issue” versus a “terrorism problem”
and how major political parties in Turkey approach the issue and its solution in their 2011
election manifestos and rallies. This article contributes the literature on the Kurdish issue in
particular and Turkey’s democratic consolidation in general by identifying the problems and
political views of all relevant sides. Finally, based on both a historical and empirical analysis,
the article reflects on the reasons why the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi and Barış ve Demokrasi
Partisi have become the major players in addressing the Kurdish issue after the 2011 election.
The findings are relevant for Turkish democratic consolidation in particular and the democra-
tization literature in general.
I dedicate this goal to the martyred sons of all the peoples of the Republic of
Turkey. I don’t want this kind of violence in my country.
Arda Turan
When Arda Turan, a renowned football player uttered these words after the Kazakh-
stan–Turkey soccer game on September 3, 2011, he did not know he was getting into
a whole new ball game. The next day, Turan was figuratively questioned, put on trial
and executed by most nationalist media outlets in the country while he was literally
applauded, appreciated and sublimed by the Kurdish political party, Peace and
Democracy Party (BDP, Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi), the Kurdish media and
Turkish left.1 Before June 2011 general elections, international observers predicted
that the circumstances were ripe for the solution of the Kurdish issue.2 However,
before and after the elections, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, Partiya Karkerên
Kurdistan) terrorist attacks rose to their peak since the mid-1990s and led to the
deaths of numerous civilians, including women and children.3 For example, the
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Çukurca attack of October 19, 2011, in which 26 soldiers lost their lives to multiple
simultaneous attacks and 18 were injured, was one of the worst attacks since the
1990s. It raised all voices in the country, particularly those of Turkish ultra-national-
ists.4 The polarization of the society peaked when some conservative nationalists
went as far to argue that the Van earthquake of October 23, 2011 was a divine
sign to everyone but foremost to the Kurds to stop fighting.5 In a highly polarized
environment, it has become harder for the likes of Arda Turan to openly want
peace when large numbers demand reprisal and retaliation in Turkey.
This article analyzes the Kurdish issue in various aspects before the June 2011
elections. The major questions that the article tackles are: what are the political, cul-
tural and economic grievances of the Kurds, Turkey’s largest unrecognized ethnic
minority?; how/why is the ongoing conflict framed as the “Kurdish issue” versus a
“terrorism problem”?; how do major political parties in Turkey approach the issue
and its solution in their 2011 election manifestos and rallies?; and, finally, what
are the major bones of contention (and consensus, if any)?
This article contributes to the literature on the Kurdish issue in particular and
Turkey’s democratic consolidation in general by identifying the problems and politi-
cal views of all relevant sides, as a recent International Crisis Group report argues that
“given the recent violence, returning to a positive dynamic requires a substantial stra-
tegic leap of imagination from both sides.”6 While the report points to the PKK and
the Turkish state as the two sides, the June 2011 elections show that the incumbent
Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) and the pro-
Kurdish BDP have become the most influential actors with respect to the Kurdish
issue in Turkey. The 2011 elections also demonstrate that the Nationalist Action
Party (MHP, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) and the Republican People’s Party (CHP,
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) are marginalized in Kurdish-populated areas.
In the past, PKK attacks were perceived mainly as a security problem that was
exacerbated by the support, direct and indirect, of several countries such as Syria,
Germany and Greece.7 However, the AKP government has gradually changed the
state discourse since 2002 and with the initiation of its 2010 “National Unity and
Brotherhood Project,” declared that the terrorism problem of Turkey can be resolved
through a democratic opening and a pluralist perspective to mitigate the grievances of
all ethnic and religious minority groups, including Kurds.8 While the AKP’s
approach became inconsistent in time dooming the Project to failure, Turkish
society has become highly polarized in the last few years. For example, Ersin Kalay-
cıoğlu finds that in the September 12, 2010 referendum on proposed constitutional
amendments, which the Kurdish nationalists boycotted, Turkish society was vastly
divided in terms of partisanship, ideological splits, economic satisfaction and religi-
osity.9 In this highly polarized setting, the June 2011 elections demonstrate that the
AKP and the BDP need to work within the political system to not only solve the
Kurdish issue but also consolidate democracy in Turkey through drafting a demo-
cratic constitution for all segments of the society, including official and non-official
minorities.10 The alternative is only further polarization, which would result in an































consolidation, but also waste its resources much needed in reconstructing cities such
as the earthquake-stricken Van.
This article is divided into five sections. First, it analyzes the roots of the Kurdish
issue and notes that presentation of it as a “terrorism problem” versus “Kurdish issue”
has become intertwined in a cycle of struggle. Next, it examines the state’s response
to the issue, including recent attempts to pursue political reforms to resolve the long-
simmering conflict. A brief assessment of the Kurdish political movement since 1991
follows. Finally, the article presents a comprehensive analysis of how the Kurdish
issue is tackled in the election manifestos and campaign speeches of the major pol-
itical parties in the parliament. It concludes with a summary and implications for
future policy.
“Terrorism Problem” Versus “Kurdish Issue”
The Ottoman Empire collapsed in the prime era of the nation-state. Accordingly, the
new Turkish Republic was built with the principles of a centralized, modernized
(Westernized) and unitary nation-state. Metin Heper argues that the new state’s defi-
nition of citizenry was not based on religion or ethnicity but on “civic nationalism,” in
which self-association with the state is sufficient for citizenry.11 Nevertheless, while
neither the Constitution nor statesmen defined the new state on ethnic identity, fre-
quent references to “Turks” in state discourse blended with the denial of Kurdish
identity over the years and engendered restrictive policies. According to Mesut
Yeğen, “Turkish citizenship has, from the beginning of the Republic, oscillated
between an ethnic and a political definition of the (Turkish) nation” resulting in
Kurdish grievances.12
The revolutionary practices of secularization in addition to rapid modernization
through centralization of production and taxation led to rebellions in the southeast
of Turkey where the Kurdish population resided with Arabs, Turks, Alevis and
Assyrians, and had been accustomed to a decentralized state system for centuries.
These rebellions, however, failed to derail the Turkish state from its main goals. Para-
doxically, one could argue that, starting from 1925, Kurdish “rebellions have aided in
the formation of two fundamental precepts: political unity and secularism,”13 which
have underlined the state’s policies toward not only the Kurds but all ethnic and reli-
gious groups in the country. The Republic was built on the premise of one nation and
did not include ethnicity in the definition of its nationhood.14
The 1937–38 Dersim campaign (the massacre as Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan
acknowledged it in 2009) that took place in a mainly Kurdish Alevi city – renamed
Tunceli in 1935—led to more resentment among tribal networks in the region against
the Turkish state.15 According to Hamit Bozarslan, the resistance of the Kurds in mid-
1920s and 1930s was rather a rural opposition of tribes and religious orders not to the
Turkish state per se but rather to the notion of a central state. The situation, Bozarslan
argues, changed in the 1970–90 period as the rural movement urbanized due to an
awakening among Kurdish nationalist intellectuals which was enhanced by the insur-
gency of the PKK.16 Thus, as the Kurdish movement developed from a rural






























opposition to an organized urban movement in the 1970s by the Socialist Party of
Kurdistan (Partiya Sosyalist a Kurdistan), Turkish Worker’s Party (Türkiye İşçi
Partisi)17 and later the PKK, the collective memory and culture of the Kurdish
people internalized violent opposition as the only possible alternative to the limited
political space available to the Kurds and other citizens of Turkey alike.18
In sum, in the new Republic, the Kurdish movement started with rural violence in
the 1920s and survived the official state discourse that denied Kurdish ethnicity
throughout the following several decades. While the nature of the Kurdish conflict
has significantly transformed from early rebellions to the PKK terrorism, many
would argue that the increasing resentment among the Kurds against the state was
a consequence of both failed assimilation policies and limited opportunities for
access to political and economic power.19 This may be a consequence of the
overall under-developed nature of the democratic regime that was dominated by mili-
tary tutelary, which limited political opportunities for not only the Kurds but also the
ideological factions in the Turkish society.
Since 1980, junta believed that all violent ideological groups were eliminated in the
coup, the Turkish state was quite unprepared for guerilla war prior to the PKK’s first
attack in 1984 on security patrol stations in the Siirt and Hakkari regions.20 The PKK
started off as a Marxist–Leninist organization rather than a Kurdish nationalist move-
ment and operated from safe havens in Syria, the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon and later
in Northern Iraq.21 Furthermore, the Kurdish diaspora in Europe generously funded
PKK operations.22 In 1985, the Turkish state established the village guard system
based on hiring Kurdish villagers and arming them against the PKK. However, in
1986, the PKK started killing village guards and their families to prevent villagers
from cooperating with the state.
In 1988 and 1989, the PKK attacked civil servants until the realization of how
attacks on civilians jeopardized the organization’s prestige internationally.23 In
1990, after 13 militants were killed in a cave near Nusaybin in Mardin province,
the PKK called for serhildan, which means public uprising. One of those killed in
the operation was the son of a prominent Kurdish nationalist family and public pro-
tests lasted for days.24 In those years, the PKK committed several “crimes against
humanity” such as the Pınarcık massacre in 1987 in which 8 village guards, 16 chil-
dren and 8 women were slaughtered in a raid on a village in Mardin province.25 The
organization started using suicide terrorism in mid-1990s26 and continued its attacks
especially after the arrest of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan who was captured in Kenya
in 1999. After his imprisonment in Turkey, Öcalan shifted his strategy for almost 20
years and affirmed that the Kurdish armed struggle should combine political struggle
and civil disobedience. Thus, the PKK declared a ceasefire and withdrew forces to
Northern Iraq.27 Its attacks, however, resumed on September 1, 2003, and more
recently reached a peak not seen since the 1990s.
As this background shows, the Kurdish issue and Turkey’s terrorism problem have
long been intertwined and adversely affected the country’s democratization as well as
its foreign relations.28 The Kurds rebelled in the new Republic as early as the 1920s































created a culture of resistance. This in turn led to the justification of terrorism by the
PKK supporters in 1980s, which further alienated the state and the public from the
Kurdish movement. The Turkish state refrained from referring to the issue as a
“Kurdish issue” and instead officially argued that the issue was about “terrorism.”
Thus, until recently, the careful separation by state authorities of the Kurdish citizens’
grievances from the PKK attacks and demands helped the state to get public support
for using military measures to curb terrorism.29 While “in the early 1990s Süleyman
Demirel as president, and Erdal İnönü as leader of the Social Democratic People’s
Party (SHP, Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti), had spoken publicly of the ‘Kurdish
reality’,” the issue was still not framed as a Kurdish issue, which further exacerbated
the problem.30 Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth Winrow found that the Turkish state’s
efforts to officially deny the Kurdish ethnicity backfired by contributing to the
growth of Kurdish national consciousness.31 Moreover, the PKK’s callous terrorist
acts justified military operations to the Turkish public and contributed to the limit-
ation of Kurdish rights.32 As a result, a cycle of violence transpired regardless of
how one refers to the actual problem.
State Responses to the Kurdish Issue
Upon reviewing the background of the Kurdish issue and/or the terrorism problem,
one question begs for an answer: what has been the state’s response to PKK
attacks? The answer is simple but telling: while the state denied both the Kurdish
identity and cultural aspects of the problem, military tactics were employed for the
most part since the issue was officially framed as a terrorism problem. Nevertheless,
several other coping mechanisms have been employed to makethe PKK militants to
lay down arms.
The denial of the ethnic dimension of grievances of the Kurds has been
accompanied by state efforts to frame the issue as an economic one, manifested by
relatively low levels of economic development in the southeast. Thus, one coping
mechanism has become referring to the issue as a regional one (“the southeast
issue”) as opposed to an ethnic one (“the Kurdish issue”). Consequently, almost all
governments since the 1990s have proposed financial packages to develop the
economy in the southeast. However, with the ongoing PKK attacks targeting infra-
structure projects such as the dams built in the region, none of the economic measures
worked.
Another coping mechanism the Turkish state used was the adoption of the infa-
mous Anti-Terror Law No. 3713 in April 1991. Under Article 8 of this Anti-Terror
Law, many people were imprisoned on the grounds of promoting a separatist
agenda and belonging to terrorist organizations such as the PKK, further weakened
Turkish democracy. The anti-democratic nature of the 1982 Constitution drafted
under the junta regime after the 1980 coup increased the grievances of both the
Kurds and other fragments of the Turkish society.33
From 1985 to 2003, various Turkish governments adopted eight amnesty pro-
grams. After the July 29, 2003 Amnesty Program, the PKK declared that it would






























not yield to repentance laws and those who surrender to the state would be punished
for treason.34 Many militants were thus deterred from turning themselves into the
security forces. Clearly, amnesty programs proved futile since the PKK declared
the end of the five-year one-sided ceasefire only one month after the adoption of
the 2003 program. Thus, the 1990s were mostly characterized by successful military
operations and failed amnesty programs while the after-effects of Turkey’s European
Union (EU) candidacy have characterized the 2000s.
Turkey’s bid for EU membership has left its mark on the Kurdish issue in the last
decade. After declaring Turkey a candidate country in December 1999, the EU
demanded changes to several undemocratic laws and codes. These reforms were
passed between 2002 and 2004 through a series of eight reform packages. The Demo-
cratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti) and MHP prepared the first three reform
packages with the help of the Motherland Party (ANAP, Anavatan Partisi). The
AKP established a majority government in 2002 and enacted the packages, which
benefited the Kurdish population in various ways, in addition to other democratiza-
tion benefits in general such as the transformation of civil–military relations.35
Freedom of speech and association caught up legally with Western democratic stan-
dards, albeit not in practice, especially once Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law was
repealed in 2001. The death penalty was also abolished, resulting in a much
debated life sentence for Abdullah Öcalan. Moreover, radio and television broadcast-
ing and language courses in Kurdish were legalized,36 ending a long ban on uses of
the Kurdish language.37
These are very important developments since the lack of or the limited recognition
of demands such as language and cultural rights has often been associated with min-
ority violence in Turkey.38 The Kurds thus welcomed the EU harmonization laws
requiring civilianization of Turkish politics, while Prime Minister Erdoğan officially
acknowledged the “Kurdish issue” in 2005 in a historic speech in Diyarbakır.
Kurdish Political Participation Since the 1990s
Since inception of the Republic, the Kurds have participated in non-ethnic, main-
stream political parties and took part in governing coalitions as ministers from main-
stream parties.39 However, a Kurdish political party first participated in the
parliament in only 1991, but has never been part of a governing coalition. Almost
every Kurdish party has, eventually, been banned for jeopardizing the territorial
integrity of the state and unity of the nation. In other words, for decades, political sur-
vival of the Kurds in Turkey has been possible through non-ethnic parties, while they
have been marginalized because of an unusually high electoral threshold (ten percent
to gain seats in the National Assembly) and the practice of banning political parties
that “pose a threat” to the regime. Turkey is clearly not the only country to ban
parties; Nancy Rosenblum argues that other democratic states such as Israel, Spain
and Belgium have become “defensive democracies” as they all ban ethnic and reli-
gious parties.40 In this environment, political space available to the Kurds has been































parties and Islamist politics. A brief background on Kurdish political participation in
Turkey’s elections points to the dissatisfaction of the Kurds with their options.
The first Kurdish ethnic party, the People’s Labor Party (HEP, Halkın Emek
Partisi) was established in 1990. In October 1991, the HEP and the SHP established
an election alliance, which received nearly 21 percent of the vote. The banning of the
HEP resulted in the foundation of the Democratic Party (DEP, Demokrasi Partisi) in
1993.41 The DEP, which did not run in any elections, was followed in 1994 by the
People’s Democracy Party (HADEP, Halkın Demokrasi Partisi), which boycotted
the municipal elections, leading to Islamist Welfare Party’s sweeping success in
the southeast region. In 1995 general elections, HADEP received just over four
percent of the national vote and once again stayed outside the parliament. Most
votes in the southeast were cast for the center-right and conservative parties such
as ANAP and the Welfare Party instead of HADEP. Hamit Bozarslan explains this
failure as a consequence of tribal loyalties and the ethnic divisions among the
Kurds.42
The municipal elections of 1999 brought 38 municipalities under the control of
HADEP, which slightly increased its votes to 4.75 percent in the parliamentary elec-
tions but once again remained below the threshold. There was a closure trial against
HADEP in 1999 but, having survived that, the party was banned in 2003 by the Con-
stitutional Court on the grounds that it had ties to the PKK. HADEP’s successor,
Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP, Demokratik Halk Partisi) increased its vote
total to 6.14 percent in 2002, but still remained outside the parliament. DEHAP
was the dominant party in 12 provinces in eastern and southeastern Anatolia, per-
forming better than the nationally victorious AKP.43 This, however, once again
resulted in a limitation of the political space for the Kurds because
In 1995 and 1999 the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (RP, Refah Partisi) and Virtue
Party (FP, Fazilet Partisi) benefited from HADEP being left out of the parlia-
ment. In 2002 it was the AKP, which on average gained less than half of the
electoral support that DEHAP obtained in east and southeastern provinces,
that benefited from this representational threshold.44
Still, Kocher argues that in 2002, ‘‘the Kurdish mainstream remains politically con-
servative and unwilling to embrace the leftist agenda of Turkey’s only Kurdish
party.”45 In fact, DEHAP dissolved itself after a major setback in 2004 municipal
elections.
The Democratic Society Party (DTP, Demokratik Toplum Partisi) was established
in 2005 and, in July 2007 elections, decided to run as an independent list. It received
5.32 percent of the national vote, but did well in several provinces in the east and
southeast, which translated to 22 seats in the parliament. Ali Çarkoğlu states that
the 2007 election was a turning point for political participation of the Kurds in nation-
wide elections and added that the Kurdish movement marginalized thus far by the
PKK finally decided to bypass the threshold requirement.46 However, while the
DTP won over 20 parliamentary seats, the AKP “doubled its vote from around 26






























percent to 53 percent in the Kurdish southeast region surpassing the votes of the
ethnic Kurdish DTP.”47 Rabia Karakaya Polat argues that the granting of cultural
and identity rights and freedoms as well as economic welfare to the Kurdish popu-
lation in AKP’s first term (2002–07) are the causes of this success. Cem Başlevent
et al., on the other hand, argue that the Electorate Tendency Survey conducted in
April 2002 points to an increase in the votes of religious and nationalist political
parties in Turkey in the last decade.48 Thus, the Kurds may have continued their
voting habits in 2007, albeit a clear increase in support led to the change of tactics
of the Kurdish political movement.
The AKP and the DTP have competed against one another in the southeastern
cities in the 2009 local elections and the DTP increased the number of municipalities
under its control to 99. According to Ekrem Güzeldere, the AKP has long ignored the
DTP-ruled municipalities and after these elections.
In the entire southeast region, the AKP is still the strongest party, but compared
to the outstanding results there in the parliamentary elections in 2007, with 52
percent, the new 38.34 percent [for the AKP in 2009] total marks a significant
drop.49
Another explanation of why the AKP has been strong in Kurdish-populated areas
may be that most Kurds were indifferent to the Kurdish nationalist discourse and
due to their religiosity, they have preferred to vote for conservative parties such as
the FP and the AKP.50 This line of argument contends that only democracy and
Islam can keep Turkey integrated.51 However, there are counter-arguments on reli-
gion’s value in solving the Kurdish issue. Skeptical of the unifying nature of Islam
for the Kurds in Turkey, Zeki Sarıgil argues, “According to the AKP, the secular
nature of the Republic is the main cause of the Kurdish problem in Turkey,”52
while Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan blame the AKP for polarizing the
Turkish society with the party’s ineffective discourse based on religion.53
In this frustrating political background for the Kurds, the 2011 elections witnessed
an unprecedented success for the Labor, Democracy and Freedom Bloc (EDÖB,
Emek, Demokrasi ve Özgürlük Bloğu), formed by the BDP and other small leftist
parties’ candidates. The EDÖB received 6.58 percent of the national vote while the
AKP received nearly half of all votes. This time, the AKP received 37.37 percent
of the votes cast in 12 provinces that harbor a significant Kurdish population while
the EDÖB received 50.8 percent and the CHP received only 3.95 percent of the
votes in these provinces. The EDÖB won a significant success overall by garnering
36 seats, the majority of whom are Kurdish MPs. While by and large the AKP was the
winner of the election, the party may have lost votes in the southeast because of its
exclusionary attitude regarding the DTP and later BDP before elections.54 Moreover,
DTP’s ban in 2009, the so-called (KCK, Koma Ciwaken Kürdistan, Kürdistan
Komünler Birliği) operations in the region that led to arrests of hundreds of people
for being a member of an umbrella organization affiliated to the PKK, the inability































to deliver its promises, and finally Erdoğan’s increasingly nationalist/conservative
discourse on the Kurdish issue, all contributed to the decline of Kurdish votes for
the AKP in the 2011 elections.55 The next section analyzes the discourses of major
parties in the electoral campaign of 2011 to search for clues as to how major
parties view the Kurdish issue and how the BDP has advanced its status in the pol-
itical arena while the AKP experienced a major decline in Kurdish votes.
Major Political Parties and the Kurdish Issue in 2011 Election Manifestos
and Campaign Speeches
Justice and Development Party
The AKP’s election campaign from 2007 to 2011 changed substantially regarding the
context of the Kurdish issue. The 2007 campaign specifically targeted the Kurdish
population’s votes by acknowledging foremost the presence of a Kurdish identity,
while the 2010 democratic opening targeted mainly their rights through democratiza-
tion of the country via a new constitution. However, the AKP’s 2011 electoral cam-
paign lost Kurdish support as it antagonized the undecided Kurds in the southeastern
provinces by openly denying the presence of a “Kurdish issue.” Instead, the AKP tar-
geted and won nationalist votes in the region, sharing a great deal of the Kurdish votes
with the BDP. In other words, in the 2011 elections, contrary to 2007 elections, the
AKP’s major strategy was to win MHP voters as opposed to Kurdish voters.
The AKP’s 160-paged election manifesto was prepared in great detail and orga-
nized into main titles of advanced democracy, developed economy, viable environ-
ment and brand cities, strong society and leading country, respectively.56 In line
with the AKP’s constant emphasis on defining itself as a party of service to the
people, the widest category that appears in the manifesto is the viable economy.
The Kurdish issue, on the other hand, was included in the manifesto in a more
limited way. The actions taken by the government to solve the Kurdish issue were
summarized as the lifting of language bans, initiating a “democratic opening” in
2010 through the National Unity and Brotherhood Project, which targeted further
democratization of the country, and changed the perception of the Kurdish issue
from a security/terrorism problem to a democracy problem.57 More importantly,
the manifesto pointed to assigning increasing roles to local administrations for
local services, implicitly aiming at addressing Kurdish demands for democratic
autonomy.58 In sum, the manifesto highlighted the significance of the Kurdish
issue and the difficulty of solving it; however, the claim was that the AKP was
most qualified to solve it with its experience of nine years in government. The mani-
festo overall is professional in style and instead of pointing to the failures of other
parties, highlighted the performance and vision of the AKP in the past and looking
forward to the year 2023, the 100-year anniversary of the Turkish Republic.
The AKP’s election manifesto is quite different from its leader Tayyip Erdoğan’s
election rallies, both in style and content. There were several rallies in which the party
leader Erdoğan mentioned Kurds, the BDP or the PKK in one way or another. While






























the ideal method would be to analyze the prime minister’s speeches in all these rallies,
due to constrains of space, the focus of this article is on three speeches in Bingöl,
Tuzla and Diyarbakır rallies.59 A careful analysis of all the speeches shows that
these three speeches are most representative of how the AKP and Erdoğan envision
the Kurdish issue and its solution.60
Erdoğan’s Bingöl speech of June 8, 2011, is loaded with references to religion and
how BDP’s independent candidates abuse Islam to get votes from Bingöl.61 In its
beginning, the speech openly equates the BDP, the EDÖB’s independent candidates
and the terrorist organization PKK. More importantly, Erdoğan cites passages from
Öcalan’s published books to show how Öcalan is not a true believer; according to
Erdoğan, Öcalan tries to deceive the Kurdish people by stating that God has never
sided with the Kurds. Moreover, Erdoğan criticizes Öcalan for his delusions of
being a pseudo-God after fighting against his faith and for his contempt of namaz,
the daily Muslim prayer, by calling it “a form of theatre.” Erdoğan also indicts the
BDP for treating Öcalan as a prophet and using religion for political purposes. More-
over, Erdoğan asks his “religious Kurdish and Zaza brothers” to vote against the BDP
since he accuses the party (again since equated with the PKK) of threatening AKP
candidates in Hakkari and throwing Molotov cocktails and burning children’s
faces in imam hatip high school dormitories in Cizre and Diyarbakır in early June
to curtail AKP’s support in the region. Hence, Erdoğan concludes that the BDP
could not be a truly democratic party that can work for the interests of the Kurds.
In this speech, Erdoğan uses an analogy on “how the PKK has became the CHP of
the 1940s” and how both are “fascist, status quo and oppressive structures.” With this,
Erdoğan not only equates the main opposition party with a terrorist organization and
the BDP but also portrays all as heretics. Only afterwards, Erdoğan highlights actions
taken by his party to solve the Kurdish issue: lifting the state of emergency from the
Kurdish-populated regions, establishing a state TV channel in Kurdish, using bill-
boards for election campaigns in Kurdish and opening Kurdish language courses.
A final point is the socioeconomic performance of the AKP in the region; Erdoğan
points to how the region’s economy got better during his party’s reign. Interestingly,
he says he “loves” the Kurds and Zazas just as much as Turks and other ethnicities
living in Turkey and that is merely due to his religious beliefs: “Love the created
for the sake of the Creator.” For that love, Erdoğan posits, he ended the bans, con-
straints and assimilation policies that the CHP brought upon the Kurds.
As mentioned earlier, Erdoğan’s goal before the June 2011 elections seemed to
further lure Kurdish voters, which worked like a charm before the 2007 elections
while also targeting MHP votes. His speech at the Tuzla campaign speech of June
11, 2011 (as well as several others before that) lends support to this argument.
Erdoğan called the MHP—the main adversary to Kurdish demands for greater
rights and freedoms—“racist” and “skull nationalist” in many of his speeches. This
rhetoric is not new at all. In his rallies before 2009 municipal elections, Erdoğan
used the same line arguing that the real nationalist strengthens the country’s
economy instead of hiding behind a nationalist discourse.62 In the Tuzla rally,































Kurdish ministers in his cabinet. He contends that his party is the only party that prop-
erly represents the Kurds– –implying the BDP does not. Moreover, he emphasizes
the motto of “one flag, one country, one nation, one state” positing that the Kurds
do not want independence. This motto is deemed as the best solution to the
Kurdish problem, which Erdoğan implies almost achieved after practices such as
lifting of the state of emergency, Kurdish broadcasting, etc. The speech highlights
the service-oriented mentality of the AKP in the west and southeast alike; service
in this discourse is equated to civilization, which, according to Erdoğan, is what all
citizens of Turkey deserve.
Finally, the Diyarbakır rally of June 1 once again connects the themes of religion,
nationalism and service highlighting the unity of the Kurds and the rest of Turkey by
pointing to the heroic deeds that the Turks and Kurds have undertaken together. A
Kurdish conqueror, Selahaddin Eyyubi (1138–93) and his religiosity are highlighted
to convince the audience that religion is more binding than nationalism of any sort,
Kurdish or Turkish. Once again, the violent actions of the PKK are cursed and bound
with the BDP to persuade the Kurds that the AKP is more able and willing to rep-
resent the Kurds than these two separatist organizations. Overall, Erdoğan’s discourse
is based on claims that the AKP is the true believer, the true nationalist and the true
democrat, whose aim is to attract not only nationalist votes but also Islamist and
Kurdish ones. The rallies are different from the election manifesto in the sense that
the latter is more rational and focuses on performance as opposed to the former
that trashes opponents and polarizes voters.
Labor, Democracy and Freedom Bloc
The most concise of the election manifestos among the four major political parties
analyzed is EDÖB’s.63 The manifesto’s jargon is in general anti-capitalist, anti-
imperialist and socialist since the bloc’s parties are aligned at the far to moderate
left of the ideological spectrum. The manifesto introduction clarifies the target as
the AKP and argues that the incumbent party has not done anything in the last
nine years for improving the major issues of the country such as the Kurdish issue,
a new and democratic constitution and unemployment. Moreover, the manifesto
points to first Erdoğan’s acknowledgement of the presence of the Kurdish issue in
2005 and later the change of his discourse in 2011 to “there is no Kurdish issue,
but our Kurdish brothers have problems.” The priority of the manifesto is on the
Kurdish issue; however, women, health, environment, democratization and
economy are also part of a socialist agenda and discourse.
The manifesto’s main argument is that as long as repression, assimilation, denial
and deadlock in Kurdish affairs continues to be the state policy, the issue will
remain unsolved. More specifically, the manifesto promises that the bloc would
work for ending the war of 30 years if all parties, including the AKP, set aside pol-
itical and economic profits, finalize ongoing negotiations with İmralı (aka Öcalan)
from the last three years, form a commission to scrutinize massacres, and change
the electoral law to lower the election threshold. Moreover, the manifesto proposes






























changing the very centralized political system in the country to one with more demo-
cratic autonomy, featuring a decentralized system of administration consisting of 20–
25 autonomous regions that would connect local authorities and the people with the
central government and redistribute the taxes collected by the latter. In this frame-
work, while Turkish would remain as the official language in the administrative
bodies, other languages could be used upon needs of the region (in addition to
freedom of education in one’s mother tongue). More importantly, the manifesto
emphasizes that this proposal aims to do what the republic should have done for
several decades, and that this model would bring peace and democracy to the
country as opposed to disintegration and separation. Interestingly, contrary to the
BDP’s previous secular stance, religious freedom is highlighted and there is specific
reference to the wearing of the headscarf in a supportive way. Finally, the manifesto is
keen on women’s rights and concrete steps for improving women’s lives in Kurdish-
populated regions and all over Turkey.
In line with EDÖB’s election manifesto, the BDP’s rallies centered around similar
themes of Kurdish struggle for recognition of political and cultural rights. There were,
though, interesting twists throughout the campaign, which deserve further delibera-
tion. After a careful examination of all speeches, the bloc’s Van, Mersin and Diyarbakır
rallies are analyzed here as representative of Kurdish politicians’ election discourses.64
First, the discourses in the rallies from the more hawkish party members differed
from those of moderates to a great extent. For example, during the April 17, 2011
rally in Van, Abdullah Öcalan’s former lawyer and an MP candidate Aysel
Tuğluk, argued that Öcalan should be released from prison and should rightfully
serve as his people’s leader. Tuğluk added that the fight the Kurds carry out would
continue until independence.65 This speech added to Tuğluk’s several other speeches
and actions supporting the PKK. Another MP candidate of EDÖB, Filiz Koçali’s
speech at the Diyarbakır rally in June 4 called for better conditions for Öcalan,
and, contradicting the party’s own election manifesto, demanded “a two-region
system with an autonomous Kurdistan.”
On the other hand, the Chair of the BDP, Selahattin Demirtaş, in rallies like the one
in Mersin in June 5, followed a less radical discourse, pointing mostly to the oper-
ations undertaken by the security forces that arrested hundreds of BDP members
including mayors in KCK operations for supporting PKK’s urban structures
aiming to replace the Turkish state.66 Demirtaş argued that not even the 1980 junta
arrested so many people for their opinions and that Erdoğan spoke differently to
the Kurds and Turks. In sum, BDP rallies show that the inner factions in the party
and the Kurdish movement reflect differently on the BDP discourse. This is hardly
different than other parties. However, overall, it seems that BDP’s association with
the PKK hurts the Kurdish party more than the AKP’s association with an Islamist
core hurts the AKP. While the AKP’s base has accepted a non-violent political strat-
egy, albeit one that still disturbs many defenders of the secular Turkish Republic, the
BDP’s association with the PKK that has carried out acts such as suicide terrorism
against civilians is unacceptable for mainstream Turkish political parties and the































Second, the BDP seems to have changed tactics by adding conservative politicians
such as Şerafettin Elçi to the election bloc and religious elements to its discourse in its
manifesto and rallies.67 Moreover, a former Islamist National View member, Altan
Tan used a sharp religious discourse in rallies, and argued that the AKP had done
nothing for the religious Kurds and Turks during its long tenure, including the head-
scarf issue and a new constitution. Tan’s remarks in a Silvan (Diyarbakır province)
rally of April 24 on how Erdoğan could bring Shari’a or the EU into the picture to
solve Turkey’s issues were very controversial.68 Moreover, boycotts of Friday
prayers at the mosques have been used as an act of civilian disobedience by the
Kurdish party69 pointing to the incorporation of religious discourse and acts into
Kurdish politics. In sum, these developments reflect major changes: the centuries-
long tribal divisions in the Kurdish movement seem to have been left behind
before the June 2011 elections while the secular Maoist movement of the 1980s
and 1990s has transformed into a populist, nationalist movement that incorporates
religion and conservatism into its rubric. The movement, in a way, has finally recon-
ciled with the conservative and tribal culture of the region, which led to unprece-
dented electoral success for the Kurds.
The Republican People’s Party
The CHP’s 135-page election manifesto is rich and organized.70 Similar to the AKP,
the party arranged its manifesto under different headings of liberal democracy,
environment-friendly economy, social equality and solidarity, urbanization and
welfare, and foreign policy based on peace, democracy and development. The
Kurdish issue per se was not acknowledged in the manifesto and there is only
limited mention of Kurds in the text: “the CHP will establish pluralist and liberal
democracy to lift the obstacles of the Kurdish citizens’ enjoying their identity.”71
Other than this reference, the manifesto referred to the development and unemploy-
ment problems of the east and southeast under the AKP government and promised to
bring democracy and peace to the region as well as completion of development pro-
jects such as the Southeastern Anatolia Project, a comprehensive regional develop-
ment project. The emphasis was on the multi-ethnic structure of the population and
the unity of the state. Nevertheless, the CHP made a very important promise
related to the Kurdish issue: under the heading of local administrations, the party
pledged to lift the AKP’s reservation on the European Charter of Local Self-Govern-
ment that Turkey accepted, which guarantees political, administrative and financial
independence of local administrations by law. The promised practice targets all
local governments in Turkey, hence it would be fair to argue that the CHP does
not pledge much specifically to the Kurds in the party’s election manifesto while
the election rallies tell a completely different story.
Upon examination of all CHP election rallies, the Hakkari and Eskişehir speeches
are selected as representative to portray CHP’s outlook of the Kurdish issue.72 The
Hakkari rally is an especially significant one since the media and both the MHP
and the AKP have used this rally to associate the CHP with the BDP/PKK. The






























Eskişehir rally is particularly interesting since it shows how the CHP discourse in the
west of the country differs in terms of topics tackled, the tone and the framing of the
Kurdish issue from the discourse used in the east and southeast.
The May 23, 2011 rally of the CHP in Hakkari was very controversial. First, the
rally was packed while the AKP’s rally in the same city the day before was boycotted.
Second, the leader of the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, visited the mayor of Hakkari,
Fadıl Bedirhanoğlu of the BDP, who was accused by Erdoğan of forcing shopkeepers
in the city to close down their businesses before his rally. Kılıçdaroğlu listened to the
mayor’s complaints about the KCK operations that peaked before the elections, alleg-
edly since the government wanted to intimidate and repress the opposition. Later in
his speech, Kılıçdaroğlu harshly criticized the AKP government for arresting mayors
that came to office with people’s votes and for keeping them in prison for months
without a conviction. Kılıçdaroğlu highlighted that the CHP wanted freedom and
democracy for everyone even at instances of significant differences of opinion.73
Third, Kılıçdaroğlu referred to the European Charter of Local Self-Government
and promised to abide by universal rules when the CHP came to power.74 He
further argued that strong local administrations could more readily provide services
to the people, and the era of mayoral visits to Ankara to beg for funding for basic ser-
vices would finally come to an end. Finally, Kılıçdaroğlu criticized Erdoğan for
saying “there is no Kurdish issue in Turkey.” He argued that Erdoğan did not
listen to the problems of the Kurdish people; instead, the AKP government listened
to people’s private calls by tapping phone lines. Kılıçdaroğlu then made an important
point: he stated he was ready to solve any problem related to ethnic or religious iden-
tity. By stating that no one should be “othered” in the country and that he would solve
the issue of education in one’s mother tongue, Kılıçdaroğlu changed the CHP’s tra-
ditional discourse of the Republican Era. Moreover, he added that the village evacua-
tions in the region would be compensated and rehabilitated if his party won the
elections. Finally, Kılıçdaroğlu was critical of Erdoğan for promising new prisons
to the people in the region. This was another sign, he argued, of the repressive policies
of the AKP government.
Kılıçdaroğlu’s Eskişehir rally of June 4, on the other hand, harbored quite a defen-
sive discourse and tone since it took place in a non-Kurdish-populated city. Since he
was harshly criticized by both the AKP and the MHP after his speeches in the south-
eastern cities that lauded strong local autonomy, Kılıçdaroğlu did not mention
regional autonomy in this rally. Instead, he highlighted the concept of a “common
flag” that Erdoğan had been using in his rallies. Kılıçdaroğlu blamed Erdoğan for
owning the flag for himself and stressed that the flag belonged to all 73 million citi-
zens in Turkey. Interestingly, he did not mention the Kurdish issue at all in his
speech; while in another Eskişehir rally in July 2010, he had framed the issue as a
“terrorism issue” that was not solved by the AKP government for so many years,
as opposed to a “Kurdish issue.”75 Overall, the CHP’s approach to the Kurdish
issue was at best limited in its election manifesto and rallies and rather inconsistent
as a whole, which explains why the CHP was a non-option for Kurdish voters in
































There is not as much to analyze in MHP’s election manifesto in terms of the party’s
approach to the Kurdish issue.77 As it had in the past, the party openly rejected any
ethnic or rival identity to Turkish national identity and promised to stand against con-
stitutional amendments or a new constitution that may lead to
transformation of individual rights and freedoms into ethnic collective rights;
building a multi-ethnic state that politically and legally accommodates differ-
ent ethnic identities; creating artificial minorities by giving status to
languages other than Turkish; changing the definition of national identity to
“Turkeyness (Türkiyelilik);” democratic autonomy; [and] education in other
languages.78
In other words, the MHP openly declared that it was against any attempts to solve the
Kurdish issue because it denied the presence of any such issue; instead, in MHP’s
discourse, global dominant powers have used ethnic and religious differences and
separatist terrorism to realize their aims on Turkey. The issue, then, is a terrorism
problem and this security threat should be tackled with a strong military.79
The MHP was quite consistent with its discourse and action in terms of the Kurdish
issue in its election manifesto and election rallies. After a careful examination of all
rallies, speeches in Istanbul, Diyarbakır and Gaziantep rallies are selected to sample
MHP’s approach to the issue. The rallies in the east and southeast of the MHP’s
leader, Devlet Bahçeli, were more limited compared to those of Erdoğan and Kılıç-
daroğlu, and it seems that the party did not try very hard to attract Kurdish votes.
Bahçeli often argued that other parties talk differently in the east and the west and
therefore the MHP is the only trustworthy political party.80 Nevertheless, while Bah-
çeli’s speeches in the west (i.e. Bursa and Istanbul) went as far to blame the AKP and
PKK for trying to partition the country in a secret alliance, the ones in the southeast
(i.e. Diyarbakır and Gaziantep) were rather implicit in these claims. The tone was
milder and the dose and directness of the accusations to the PKK were significantly
reduced. Moreover, the past statist discourses of economic development being the
region’s only problem was often highlighted. For example, in his Diyarbakır rally
of June 6, Bahçeli asked whether the economic problems in the region would be
solved if education in one’s mother tongue becomes a constitutional right. He
pointed to the historical, religious and cultural ties that bind the Turkish nation
together and asked the public to vote for the MHP if they wanted development.81 Fur-
thermore, in his Gaziantep rally in June 10, Bahçeli argued that the democratic
opening process that the AKP initiated led to an increase in terrorism and politicized
separatist movements that now demanded democratic autonomy, a bilingual state,
etc., which would eventually lead to secession demands. Among all his speeches,
the Diyarbakır rally seems to be less polarizing due to its mild tone and the stressing
of brotherhood of all groups in Turkey; however, the minor vote share of the MHP in
the region shows that Bahçeli did not convince the Kurds that their utmost problem is






























unemployment and that there is a terrorism problem in the region that can only be
tackled using military retaliation.
After-Election Political Crisis and the Rise in Terrorism
After the June 2011 elections, the CHP and BDP boycotted the National Assembly
since eight of their deputies were still in prison, albeit not yet convicted in the
KCK and Ergenekon trials.82 Moreover, the BDP’s Diyarbakır deputy convicted of
supporting the PKK, Hatip Dicle, lost his seat, which was transferred to AKP’s
Oya Eronat, raising AKP’s total seats to 327. These acts raised concerns about the
AKP’s authoritarian tendencies, although Prime Minister Erdoğan highlighted the
value of consensus in all segments of the political spectrum in his balcony speech
after his party raised its votes for the third time—a record in Turkish political history.
The BDP’s and the CHP’s boycott of the Turkish Great National Assembly created
an unprecedented situation, with the largest opposition party remaining outside the
parliament. President Abdullah Gül and Parliamentary Speaker Cemil Çiçek’s
mediation efforts resulted in CHP swearing on July 1, followed by the BDP on
October 1. The most important item on the agenda of the parliament since then has
been the drafting of a new constitution. The AKP aimed at changing the constitution
long before the elections and needed 367 seats for altering the constitution on its own,
or 330 seats to take the change to a referendum. Neither option was possible after the
election, which meant that the new constitution would require a broad consensus.83
However, the terrorist attack on civilians in Ankara by an armed branch of the
PKK on September 21 cast a shadow over the first attempts of constitution
writing, after which the BDP joined the parliament and the 12-member parliamentary
commission led by the speaker of the parliament Cemil Çiçek to draft the new con-
stitution. BDP’s deputies Sırrı Süreyya Önder, Altan Tan and Ayla Akat became
members of the commission that first met on October 13, 2011.84 However, the
Çukurca attacks of October 18 on a day that the commission met for constitutional
consensus led to calls for retaliation by many, including President Gül,85 while the
BDP leader Selahattin Demirtaş called on both the PKK and the Turkish military
to stop the fighting and asked everyone to search for ways to build peace.86 How
that would be possible is, of course, depends on whether one perceives the issue as
a “Kurdish issue” or solely a “terrorism problem.”
Conclusion
After the June 2011 election, it became clear that two major political parties in Turkey
publicly supported the context of the Kurdish issue: the AKP and the BDP.87
However, the AKP does not recognize the BDP as a representative of the Kurdish
population although the party fared well in the southeast.88 Erdoğan also argues
that the PKK is not representative of the Kurds, and points to the massacres of the
organization of innocent civilians.89 While the PKK is recognized internationally































share from 5.2 to 6.4 percent in the last national elections and received votes of more
than 2.5 million citizens in Turkey. BDP deputies serve with the rest of the deputies in
a consensus commission to draft a new constitution. In other words, there is no jus-
tification of Erdoğan’s claim that the BDP does not represent the Kurds. Repeated
failure to recognize Kurdish presence in Turkey’s political arena has led to a cycle
of violent riots, struggle for political and cultural rights through legal means followed
by brutal terrorist tactics and more political struggle. Turkish politicians have long
been victims of wishful thinking that the Kurdish issue would go away on its own.
The analysis here contends that the June 2011 elections showed once again that the
MHP and CHP were not deemed credible actors in the Kurdish issue; the former was
reluctant to accept the presence of the issue and the latter was reluctant to address the
issue using a more comprehensive approach. The once revolutionary AKP policies,
on the other hand, are no longer consistent in terms of the Kurdish issue as the
party trıes to juggle nationalist, conservative and Kurdish votes. Finally, the BDP,
as a pro-Kurdish party, has become stronger after incorporating conservative and tra-
ditional elements in its election bloc. However, the party is destined to be alienated in
the country as long as it does not distance itself from the generally reviled PKK.
While it may take a while to make a clear break with the PKK, better control of
the hardliners in the party may restructure the perceptions of the other parties of
the BDP as a legitimate actor in the country’s politics and result in recognition of
major rights of the Kurds in the new constitution.
A parliament that works toward a national consensus on a new and free constitution
may not completely obliterate the effects of the 1980 coup and its constitution; neverthe-
less, it may console some including the Kurds. In a 1995 article, Nur Bilge Criss argued,
The only nonmilitary solutions to this conflict seem to be nationwide reforms,
one being in the form of efficient local administration, a change in the electoral
system from a single-tier to a double-tier system, and the containment of terror-
ist attacks in order to be free to build up the region’s infrastructure.90
It seems that, sadly, these solutions that were offered 17 years ago are still valid in
Turkey today.
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33. Burak Bilgehan Özpek, “Constitution Making in Turkey After the 2011 Elections,” Turkish Studies,
Vol. 13, No. 2.
34. Marcus (2009), p. 163.
35. Nil S. Satana, “Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy,” Armed Forces &
Society, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2008), pp. 357–388.
36. There was no reference to Kurdish in the amendment; however, the implicit target was the Kurdish
language. The state established a state-sponsored Kurdish TV in 2008, which is much criticized by
Kurdish nationalists as another attempt for assimilation. The Kurdish language courses, on the other
hand, did not become popular in the region. The Kurdish politicians, as a result, demand education
in Kurdish in schools.
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73. “Hakkari’de Kılıçdaroğlu İzdihamı,” Milliyet, Mayis 23, 2011.
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